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“On the Road to Mandalay”: The Development of Railways in British Burma, 1870-1900 
 
Introduction 
 In the months surrounding the British invasion and annexation of Upper Burma in 1885 
and 1886, there was a surge of interest in Britain about the new colony. As Lower Burma’s 
capital city of Rangoon grew larger and Mandalay – formerly outside of British jurisdiction - 
became the center of British commerce in Upper Burma, capitalists saw in the region an 
untouched wealth of resources awaiting development and exploitation. With sensational titles 
such as ‘The Best Unopened Market in the World,’ major newspapers throughout Britain 
published a rush of articles about Burma at the time, outlining the colony’s future economic 
potential alongside their ruminations on the ‘despotic’ King Thebaw and the need to keep India’s 
northeast frontier secure.1 With its ‘brave, loyal, and desirable subjects,’ these commentators 
thought that Burma’s frontier regions offered unlimited wealth to the shrewd investor willing to 
invest his capital in what was seen as a lost ‘El Dorado.’2 As the British official in Burma, James 
G. Scott, would say, ‘everything conspires to show that Burma is the most valuable addition to 
our empire made for many years.’3 
 The rising interest among British officials and capitalists about Burma’s economic 
potential presaged a transformation in Burma’s political, social, and economic landscape over the 
next few decades. Whether through the rapid growth of Lower Burma’s rice industry or the 
emergence and expansion of the oil and mining industries in Burma’s north, Burma changed 
dramatically from the 1870s until the turn of the twentieth century.4 In 1901, the colonial official 
John Nisbet argued that Burma had ‘already’ become ‘one of the brightest jewels in the Imperial 
diadem of India,’ adding that its ‘lustre’ will only ‘increase in proportion as inducements are 
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offered for the influx of the capital and labour necessary for more rapid development.’5 
According to Stephen Keck, the period between 1895 and 1918 – or ‘Burma’s New Century’ – 
witnessed the consolidation of British rule in the colony and was ‘when some of the key realities 
of colonization became fully manifest.’ Prior to the emergence of a large-scale anti-colonial 
nationalist movement and, ultimately, decolonisation, Keck labels this period the ‘apogee’ of 
British rule in Burma.6  
 Keck’s insights have reoriented the periodisation of British colonialism in Burma, but the 
vision of a ‘New Century’ Burma was actually crafted and began to develop well before the turn 
of the twentieth century. To disentangle this history, this paper examines debates about Burma 
during the late nineteenth century through the prism of a single, but singularly important, case 
study: the expansion of Burma’s railway system. A study of Burma’s railway system is 
important for a variety of reasons. First, and unlike in neighboring India or elsewhere in the 
British Empire at this time, the history of Burma’s railways has received relatively little 
scholarly attention, despite their centrality to Burma’s development during the colonial period 
and their continued significance in the post-colonial world.7 The economic impact of railways, 
however, was only one way that they were important. As Manu Goswami suggests, railways 
were both ‘metonyms of a colonial modernizing project’ and ‘key sites for the institution of the 
colonial political economy of difference.’8 Railways not only influenced how people and goods 
circulated in a given territory, but they also had dramatic material affects on the social life of its 
inhabitants and the spatiality - or ‘shape’ - of the colonial occupation. Railways simultaneously 
acted as a state-making tool for colonial powers as well as a nation-building site of contestation 
for colonised populations.9 The construction of railways, in short, had profound economic, 
social, and political consequences in colonial territories, Burma included. 
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 This paper focuses on debates about railway construction in Burma in order to reveal how 
railways and public works projects became a key site of contestation about the colony’s 
prospects during the late nineteenth century. In the 1870s and 1880s, colonial officials, 
businessmen, and journalists across the British imperial landscape engaged in heated discussions 
about Burma’s social and political future, as well as the economic potential of the region. Many 
of these disputes were framed around Burma’s nascent railway system. These debates, which 
would ultimately color the British decision to invade and annex Upper Burma in the 1880s, 
included not only officials in Burma, India, and Britain, but also members of the commercial 
community, all of whom had their own priorities and ideas about how to properly develop the 
colony. The debates about Burma’s railways were ultimately critical to Burma’s development. 
Not only did they fashion the policies, ideas, and interest groups that would remain influential in 
the colony into the late colonial period, but they also shaped the subsequent construction and 
path of Burma’s railway network.  
Nevertheless, the success of efforts to build railways in Burma proved questionable. 
Owing to a variety of factors, including a lack of capital and endless disagreements about the 
viability of certain railway schemes, the construction of Burma’s railway system was slow and 
fraught with difficulties, even after the eventual privatisation of the colony’s railways in the 
1890s. In the end, the construction of railways in Burma never produced the economic triumph 
that colonial officials, businessmen, and planners imagined for the colony. However, the debates 
about railways in Burma reveal how a litany of agents – from colonial officials in Rangoon, 
Calcutta, and London to foreign capitalists located around the globe - influenced the path and 
nature of economic development in the colony, while also showing how and why Burma’s 
railway system developed the way that it did during the late nineteenth century.  
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The Development of Burma’s Railway System 
 
 The emergence of Burma’s railway system occurred against the backdrop of vast political 
changes in the country. Prior to the annexation of 1886, Burma was divided between Upper and 
Lower Burma. Following wars in the 1820s and 1850s, British forces occupied and annexed 
Lower Burma – which included the city of Rangoon – and incorporated the territory as a 
province within the government of British India. Upper Burma - also known as the ‘Kingdom of 
Ava’ or, more simply, Burma’ - remained independent and under the rule of a Burmese King. 
Although the two powers enjoyed a tepid political and economic relationship in the 1860s and 
early 1870s, their relationship eventually soured.10 In 1875, a tense standoff between Burma’s 
King Mindon and the British Indian government over the so-called ‘shoe question’ led to the 
termination of diplomatic relations between the two countries.11 Following the death of Mindon 
in 1878 and the accession of King Thebaw, this policy remained in place, and tension only 
increased between the two countries.12 Ultimately, in 1885, British forces invaded Mandalay, 
exiled King Thebaw to India, and incorporated the whole of Burma into the British Empire.13  
Prior to the political upheavals of the 1870s, inland transportation in Burma was 
completely reliant on water transport on the Irrawaddy River. In 1864, the Irrawaddy Flotilla and 
Steam Navigation Company, founded by the Scotsman Todd Findlay, brokered a deal with the 
British Burma government to provide steamer services on the river. This deal came as a result of 
a commercial treaty enacted between British Burma and independent Burma in 1862, when it 
was agreed that the two countries would protect foreign agents – particularly traders – who 
entered their respective territories and that fixed trade duties. The British, particularly interested 
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in the trade to China, were also allowed to send a survey mission through Upper Burma into 
Yunnan. Led by Arthur Phayre, Burma’s first Chief Commissioner, the British government 
believed that contracting out to a private company would cut down costs and provide a more 
efficient service on the Irrawaddy, and Findlay’s bid was accepted.14 The 1862 Treaty would 
later be revised in 1867, reducing the duties that British agents had to pay on both imports and 
exports. It was at this time that regular steamer services began operating between Lower and 
Upper Burma, launching a weekly service from Rangoon to Mandalay and a monthly service to 
Bhamo on the Chinese border. These routes would be expanded in the 1870s to account for 
increased traffic.15  
 Steam navigation on the Irrawaddy provided a new outlet for trade between Upper and 
Lower Burma but the construction of railways dramatically altered the economic potential of the 
colony. Despite this, development proceeded slowly in the pre-annexation years. In 1877, the 
first railway in Burma – called the Rangoon and Irrawaddy Valley State Railway - was opened, 
connecting Rangoon with Prome and totaling 161 miles.16 Another railway that linked Rangoon 
and Toungoo, which at the time was located on the border of Upper Burma, was completed in 
1885, just months before the British invasion. This line reduced travel time to the frontier from 
around twenty-five days to only a half-day.17 Called the Rangoon and Sittang Valley State 
Railway and totaling 166 miles, the addition of this railway meant that on the eve of annexation, 
British Burma had a total of 333 miles of railway constructed in the country.18 Following the 
war, the Rangoon and Sittang Valley State Railway would be extended another 220 miles to 
Mandalay, connecting the territories of Upper and Lower Burma through an overland rail service 
for the first time.19 Even still, and despite its profound importance to British interests in Burma, 
railway construction would remain a fraught enterprise in the colony. 
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In the 1940s, J.S. Furnivall, a former official in Burma, commented that ‘in justifying 
their claim to exercise to dominion,’ colonial powers point to public works ‘as proof of their 
beneficent activities.’20 This was certainly the case in Burma, where for colonial officials, the 
construction of railways pointed to the solidity of British rule. As early as 1873, when dialogue 
about the first railway in the country was underway, Burma’s Chief Commissioner, Ashley Eden, 
noted that the railway’s ‘chief effect morally will be in the idea conveyed to the minds of the 
mass of the population of the permanency of our occupation of the country.’ At a time when 
‘silly rumours floated about’ of Britain’s intentions to restore their territories back to the 
Burmese Crown, Eden thought that the railway would dispel such notions. Furthermore, because 
the Toungoo Railway would extend to Upper Burma’s border, it potentially had significant 
political advantages. Through the ‘free interchange of ideas and communications between our 
own territories and Upper Burma,’ Eden argued, the railway would benefit both countries. And 
with the added efficiency the railway would provide for the movement of police and troops, it 
also meant Britain could keep a closer eye on its neighbors to the north in case of any 
disturbances.21  
 The social and political motives for railway construction that Eden described in the 1870s 
provide insight into how British officials stationed in Burma saw economic development in the 
colony at the time. In considering the estimated cost of constructing the Rangoon-Prome 
Railway, Eden’s Officiating Chief Engineer and Secretary, W.S. Oliphant, noted that despite 
high costs, the railway would prove remunerative. According to Oliphant, all estimates ‘may turn 
out fallacious however moderately they may be framed, but as bearing upon a young country like 
Burma which has hitherto progressed and is still progressing with such rapid strides as regards 
population, trade and material wealth,’ that ‘it is almost impossible to over-estimate the 
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advantages likely to accrue from the construction of a railway, although the immediate money 
returns may not be so great as anticipated.’22 For Eden and his local officials, the construction of 
a railway symbolised progress for the colony, both economically and socially. A railway would 
not only improve the economic prospects of the colony but it would also filter down to colonised 
populations and improve their material and social well being. The railway, for these officials, 
was an ameliorative device as well as it was a technological one. 
 The idea that railways were a civilising tool echoed the language that British officials 
used in neighboring India, but it was also attached to a vision of Burma that became prominent 
during the 1870s: the belief that if developed properly and treated fairly by the British Indian 
Government, Burma’s capacity to grow was limitless.23 For Eden, criticisms of the railway based 
on financial concerns were founded on ‘a very fallacious view of the real question at issue.’ The 
Chief Commissioner instead argued that the question in Burma was ‘not to provide means of 
transport for such trade as now exists,’ but ‘rather to endeavour by a judicious outlay to stimulate 
and develop the trade of a young and rising province by means of a Railway, and to increase our 
production by the facilities of transport which that Railway will afford.’ The sum of money that 
the Government of India provided was not designed to support existing traffic but ‘for creating 
fresh traffic.’ ‘All we have to do,” Eden added, ‘is to shew that there is sufficient existing traffic 
to warrant the belief, that with increased facilities that traffic will increase proportionately and 
pay a fair return while this development is going on.’24 The goal was not to provide an 
infrastructure for Burma as it was, but instead, for a vision of what it could be in the future.  
Eden’s comments about railway development demonstrate how a specific, Anglo-
Burmese set of interests emerged during the pre-annexation years, and how these interests 
existed in isolation from those originating in Calcutta or London. This was particularly the case 
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regarding budgetary concerns. What the Chief Commissioner’s office was considering in its 
support of the Rangoon-Prome Railway was the financial estimates and remunerative potential of 
the railway, not merely for Burma but for the greater imperial good. Eden noted that when 
‘taking into consideration the large annual surplus withdrawn from this Province for the General 
Administration of the Empire and the fact that this surplus is likely to increase annually,’ that he 
had ‘no hesitation in affirming that British Burma has a very strong moral claim to the return of a 
portion of the very large amount it has contributed to the Imperial Exchequer during the last ten 
years’ for the ‘construction of a line of railway.’ In addition, the Chief Commissioner pointed out 
that ‘the tax payers of Burma contribute their share annually to the funds set apart for meeting 
the interest on the Guaranteed and State Railways but receive nothing whatever in return.’ 
Providing a surplus to the imperial coffers as well as containing a population of tax-payers who 
deserved to see the fruits of their public contributions, Eden argued that it was time for the 
Government of India ‘to sanction this important work immediately.’ If not, he noted, Eden hoped 
that a private company might fulfill such needs.25  
 Although the Indian Government ultimately sanctioned the construction of the Rangoon-
Prome railway in 1874, Eden continued to lobby for the expansion of Burma’s railway system. 
When a private company, the Burma Company Limited, petitioned the government to construct a 
light railway from Rangoon to Toungoo, Eden urged the government to take control. In Eden’s 
opinion, by ‘opening out the fine valley of the Sittang to settlement and cultivation, Government, 
as landlord of the whole country, would reap all the direct and indirect advantages resulting from 
the construction of a Railway.’ This included land tax that would be acquired from the newly 
cultivated land, capitation tax on those who would move there, customs duties on exports and 
imports from Europe, and ‘advantages in a military and administrative point of view.’ Because 
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transit times would go down, trade with the Karenne and Shan States would also be developed, 
and the country around China and Laos would be opened up by land for the first time.26 Eden 
once again threatened that a private enterprise could be utilised if state funds were not 
forthcoming, but the government responded that ‘the Government of India is opposed to any 
private enterprise to construct railways in India.’ Instead, the Indian Government noted that there 
was ‘good reason’ to construct the Toungoo railway and sent a survey to the area.27  
 These debates over railway construction highlight the precarious position British Burma 
found itself in during the pre-annexation years. Although visitors to the country noted how 
different Burma was from India economically, socially, and culturally, Lower Burma during this 
time was officially a province within the Government of India.28 Because of this, Burma was 
subject to Indian legislation, contributed to an Indian central budget, and most often, was ruled 
by officials trained or previously stationed in India itself.29 Railways lines, along with any kind 
of public expenditure, required approval from Indian authorities, regardless of scale. Railway 
construction was an expensive and time-intensive activity, requiring vast sums of fixed capital, 
cheap labor, and safe, dependable routes. Because Burma was only just developing economically 
as a province, British officials in Burma had to persuade their superiors in Calcutta and London 
that a railway would bring progress and growth where none had previously existed. Because of 
that, official government correspondence about railways from the period reads much like a travel 
brochure meant to lure explorers with promises of vast riches: investing in Burma’s future meant 
investing in the Empire’s future. The goal of Anglo-Burmese officials was to make that 
investment seem like a sure thing. 
 
The Anglo-Burmese Lobby 
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 By the 1880s, British officials in India had warmed to the vision that Anglo-Burmese 
officials and businessmen promoted regarding the expansion of Burma’s railway system. In 
1881, Colonel W.S. Trevor, Director General of Railways in India, noted how India had opened 
9,235 miles of railway to traffic at the time, and that following Lord Lawrence’s proposals in 
1869 to extend railways, it was widely believed in the colony that railway construction was ‘a 
necessity towards the development of the resources of India.’30 Speaking on Burma, Trevor 
argued that the proposed Sittang Valley Line, which had vexed Burma’s Chief Commissioner 
Ashley Eden in the 1870s, would ‘open up a land-locked country, at present thinly peopled it is 
true, but possessing indefinite capabilities of development.’ Burma, which at the time contained 
only 161 of the 9,235 miles of railway active in India, would finally emerge from the isolation in 
which officials there found themselves.31 Such optimism, though, did not hold up in official 
policy. Construction on the Toungoo line would not begin for another four years, around the time 
British and Indian troops occupied Upper Burma. In the interim, battles between Anglo-Burmese 
officials, European businessmen in Burma, and the Government of India waged on about how to 
economically develop the colony. These disputes would color the eventual decision to invade 
and annex the country, as well as the post-annexation consensus about how to structure finances 
in the colony.  
 In 1881, at the same time that Trevor was commenting positively on the prospects of the 
Toungoo line, local businessmen in Burma became highly involved in negotiations to expand the 
railway system. In April 1881, Leon Hernandez, head of the firm L. Hernandez and Company, 
petitioned the government along with Sir Charles Forbes and Company to form a business to 
construct the railway.32 A few months later, in January 1882, another proposal led by W. Strang 
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Steel of London and John Muir of Glasgow, two of Burma’s most important businessmen at the 
time, was sent to the Chief Commissioner asking to take over and complete Burma’s railway 
system.33 While Hernandez’s petition was quickly dismissed, officials in Burma considered Steel 
and Muir’s proposal carefully, likely owing to the stature and reputation of the petitioners in the 
Anglo-Indian community.34 W. Strang Steel’s firm, Steel Brothers, was one of the largest mill 
owners and rice exporters in Burma, and held a place of prominence in Burma’s Chamber of 
Commerce.35 John Muir, on the other hand, was best known in India, where his firm Finlay, 
Muir and Co. was involved in the tea and cotton industry.36 Together, these were two of the 
principal names in the Anglo-Indian merchant community during the late nineteenth century. 
Ultimately, however, the government turned down their proposal. 
 Although some businessmen in Burma sought to take control of the colony’s railway 
system, local commercial interests were far more interested, as a whole, to lobby the government 
to expand railways using state funds. The Rangoon Chamber of Commerce represented these 
interests, actively petitioning the British colonial government to reform the colony to secure their 
welfare. These petitions were particularly marked in the years preceding the annexation of 1886. 
In 1884, for instance, the Chamber of Commerce petitioned the government numerous times 
about the need for public works.37 In one ‘Special Meeting’ called on February 29th, 1884, W.Q. 
Rowett, one of Burma’s leading rice merchants, pointed out ‘the injustice with which this 
province is treated in being made to contribute over a crore of rupees annually towards the 
imperial revenue, while the crying needs of the province are left unsupplied for want of funds.’ 
Rowett believed that the colony’s ill treatment by the Government of India was potential grounds 
for separation. The Chamber responded by creating a special sub-committee to fight the 
curtailment of local funds, arguing ‘that a much larger proportion of the revenue should be spent 
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in the province.’ For the Committee, ‘the natural development of the country is retarded by the 
insufficiency of its means of intercommunication,’ and ‘one of the chiefs wants of the province is 
numerous feeder roads for the railways already in existence, and a further development of the 
railway system.’38 In the opinion of government, local merchants were ‘strongly and 
clearly’…’in favour of Burma railways being retained as State lines.’39 
A few weeks later, Chief Commissioner Charles Bernard spoke to the Chamber of 
Commerce about Burma’s economy. While Bernard tried to assure the Chamber that nothing 
would go unfinished and left to waste because of reducing the budget, ‘at the same time,’ it was 
noted, ‘the Chief Commissioner would submit that he entirely agrees in the view taken by the 
Chamber that the progress of the province will be retarded and its prosperity jeopardised by a 
great and continued reduction in the grant for public works.’ Bernard, while agreeing with the 
Chamber, also had to remain diplomatic in his statements, owing to his position as Chief 
Commissioner. Speaking to the Chamber, Bernard observed that ‘the Government of India are 
most fully aware of the circumstances of Burma, namely, that the province contributes a larger 
taxation and a larger net surplus per head of the population than any other province of India.’ 
Bernard further noted ‘that until recent years very little was spent on roads and communications 
in Burma; that wages and the cost of work are two or three times as high in Burma as in other 
provinces; that the prosperity of the province depends mainly on the rice-merchants and the trade 
they have created and maintain,’ and furthermore, ‘that for the due progress of that prosperity the 
extension of improved roads and means of communication are most necessary.’ Even still, 
Bernard understood that if the Indian government remained reluctant to help Burma, he ‘hope[d] 
that private capitalists might be found who believe in the paying capacities of Burma,’ and who 
‘would undertake’ the construction of railways ‘if only a temporary and limited guarantee were 
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given upon the capital.’ Privatisation, seen as undesirable by top Anglo-Burmese officials only a 
decade before, began to look appealing for those in power on the eve of annexation.40  
Officials considered railways crucial to the eventual expansion of economic interests in 
the country, but railway extension was not only of interest to those businessmen operating in 
Burma itself. The rhetoric about Burma’s capacity for economic and social progress influenced 
another group of lobbyists who proved influential in the ultimate decision to annex the country: 
the China-Burma railway interest group. Archibald Colquhoun, a colonial official in Burma who 
on occasion reported for The Times, as well as the former official, Holt Hallett, led this 
movement. Beginning in the early 1880s, these two promoters utilised knowledge that they 
gained as colonial officials to lobby the government for the construction of a railway to open up 
the ‘great undeveloped markets’ that existed in Southwestern China.41 Although early visitors to 
the country – from the explorers Dr. Richardson and Captain McLeod in the 1830s to the 
influential Chief Commissioner, Sir Arthur Phayre, in the 1860s - noted Burma’s potential 
importance as a route to Chinese markets, it was in this later moment that economic development 
in Burma became a discussion worthy of comment in British metropolitan circles.42 From the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce to the confines of Whitehall, conversations about Colquhoun 
and Hallett’s scheme would have a lasting effect on development in the country, despite their 
ultimate failure.      
 Beginning in the 1880s, Colquhoun and Hallett began to pressure government agents to 
help survey and finance a railway through Burma to China.43 Colquhoun first outlined his 
proposals in his two-volume book, Across Chrysê, which outlined his travels through Yunnan, 
Siam, and the Shan States.44 Colquhoun believed that a railway to China, along with neighboring 
Siam, would accomplish a variety of tasks, which included providing a check to French interests 
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in Siam and the opening up of Chinese markets to British merchants.45 These ideas found favor 
among the commercial community back in Britain. Between 1883 and 1890, Colqhoun and 
Hallet toured throughout Britain to spark interest in their schemes, speaking at a variety of 
locations including at the London, Liverpool, Manchester, and Leeds Chambers of Commerce.46 
Drawn by the prospects of an untapped market in Southwest China that awaited the goods of an 
industrial Britain, these groups petitioned the government to allow for the expansion of railways 
in Burma.47 For these metropolitan interests, Burma was considered a bridge to Southeast and 
East Asia, an intermediate point between the British Indian Empire and the large population 
centers to the east. Railway construction in Burma became more than just a local concern, but 
one that inspired the commercial community back in Britain to look beyond the empire’s 
frontiers. 
 Colqohoun and Hallett, though, were doing more than just publishing their views and 
hoping that the onslaught of public opinion would sway the government to intervene. Privately, 
the two former officials were actively lobbying top government officials in Britain to support 
their schemes, including the Secretary of State for India, Randolph Churchill. In July 1885, as 
British administrators were considering the occupation and annexation of Burma, Colquhoun 
sent Churchill a full report on his railway scheme, statements that Churchill was ‘much 
impressed’ with.48 In the report, however, it was noted that the Government of India was 
reluctant to build such a railway owing to a ‘want of money,’ with early estimates reaching as 
high as £1,000,000 to construct the railway.49 Despite this, as late as September 1885, Churchill 
was still pushing Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy of India and the architect of Britain’s invasion of 
Burma, to push forward such a scheme. ‘Am I wrong in supposing,’ Churchill wrote, ‘that it 
might be worth your while to spend a good deal of money now on all those various methods of 
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railway and telegraph development which might have for their result the doubling and trebling of 
trade between India and China?’50 As a number of British Chamber’s of Commerce pressed 
Churchill privately, and with the weight of a re-election campaign waging against John Bright, 
the Secretary of State for India saw in Burma an opportunity to boost his public credibility and 
continue his political career. In October 1885, Churchill publically announced that he supported 
invading and annexing Upper Burma, arguing that the ‘Burmah enterprise will be a most 
remunerative investment.’51 But while the official could find solace in the invasion of Burma that 
would occur in the ensuing months, his time to celebrate would be short lived. By the end of 
1885, Churchill was out of a job.52 
 Colquhoun and Hallett’s Burma-China railways scheme would ultimately not come to 
fruition. The British occupation not only proved to be more costly than the Indian government 
hoped, but a counter-insurgency campaign in the Shan States that followed annexation redirected 
the attention of administrators.53 Despite these issues, the annexation of Upper Burma brought 
increased attention to the economic potential of Burma’s northern areas. The Shan States, in 
particular, became a new site of interest for capitalists and officials, including those who wanted 
to expand Burma’s nascent railway system. With its plethora of fertile land and mineral deposits, 
and owing to its geographical location near China, railway debates in the colony became 
refocused around the Shan States and the potential of this area to spur economic growth. It was 
on the road to the Shan States that the next wave of debates about Burma’s future lay.  
 
The Road to the Shan States 
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Railway development in Burma during the late nineteenth century gradually 
encompassed large areas of the country within a network that ended in the port city and colonial 
capital of Rangoon, where commodities extracted in the colony would be sent to the rest of the 
world. What began as a single rail service in the 1870s that connected Rangoon with Upper and 
Lower Burma’s border area soon became the foundation to a much larger system. Following 
Upper Burma’s annexation in the 1880s, the Rangoon railway was extended to Mandalay, 
linking Lower and Upper Burma by rail for the first time. While these expansions compressed 
space and time in the colony, they were not without controversy. As the previous sections have 
demonstrated, debates between Anglo-Burmese and Anglo-Indian officials about railway 
development in Burma were fierce, with concerns over budgets and traffic preventing railway 
expansion in the colony. By the 1890s, these debates would take on both familiar and new forms, 
as officials in British Burma became increasingly disillusioned with the slow pace of state-
funded development and sought new ways to spark progress in the colony. While this would 
ultimately lead to a renewed push to privatise Burma’s railway system, it was to Burma’s frontier 
areas, including the Shan States, where officials first turned their attention.  
The Shan States began to attract the attention of western businessmen during the 1880s, 
particularly following the annexation of Upper Burma. Archibald Colquhoun and Holt Hallett, 
the primary architects of the Burma-China railway scheme, saw the development of the Shan 
States as central to their plan of opening up the market between Burma and China through rail 
services, the construction of which would have to pass through the Northern Shan States. More 
than just a way station, however, Colquhoun and Hallett argued that the Shan States offered a 
great opportunity for colonial interests, including a source of cheap and reliable labor, untapped 
agricultural wealth, and rich mineral resource reserves.54 Colquhoun, in particular, noted that 
 17 
while Yunnan offered an abundance of mining prospecting sites that remained undeveloped, the 
‘Shan countries to the south are as rich in minerals as Yünnan itself’ and that there ‘is now no 
suzerain power to prevent their being worked.’ ‘There is no doubt,’ Colquhoun continued, ‘that 
the opening up of these states will be far more profitable than Eastern Yünnan could ever be,’ 
adding that for ‘the pioneer in commerce,’ the Shan States and Western Yunnan offered endless 
opportunities.55 These opportunities, however, would have to wait in the years following 
Britain’s occupation of the region. 
Despite existing within the territorial unit of Burma on British maps, the Shan States 
presented a problem for British officials following the annexation of 1886. On Burma’s eastern 
frontier with China and Siam, the Shan States were not an easily legible extension of Burma, but 
instead, a collection of unique states that had a diverse ethnic population, each with their own 
historical relationships with both the Burmese and Chinese states. Some states, for instance, had 
long-standing agreements to levy tributes to the Burmese crown in return for government 
protection, while other states either remained hostile to the Burmese government or were linked 
politically to China.56 Although British officials had visited the region throughout the pre-
colonial period, information about it was limited. Following the annexation, however, the 
government began a process of accumulating knowledge about the Shan States in order to 
construct an official policy, and a number of armed expeditions were sent to the area in order to 
gather information.57 Despite this, such knowledge gathering expeditions soon stalled. 
With the British military occupying Mandalay and its surrounding areas, many Burmese 
people loyal to the exiled crown fled to the Shan States in order to organise a counter-insurgency 
campaign, a process that local Shan chiefs aided because of their desire to remain independent. 
The hostilities, which would continue for over three years, convinced British officials that in 
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order to maintain peace on the Indian Empire’s geopolitically important border with China, they 
would have to uphold existing agreements between the Shan States and the government, which 
included the limited interference of outside powers.58 The ‘pacification’ of the Shan States, as the 
future Chief Commissioner Charles Crosthwaite named it, was a significant moment for the 
voicing of the Shan States’ self-determination, and allowed for a nominal independence from 
British occupation until the late colonial period.59 Even at the peak of violence in the region, 
though, British officials had begun the process of elucidating the economic viability of the Shan 
States, along with its future as a colony.  
In 1886, and within days of the British annexation of Upper Burma, the colonial 
administration began to craft a plan to economically develop their new territories. In January 
1886, the government considered proposals to construct a railway to Mandalay – thought to be 
the center at ‘which produce will be sold, exchanged, and distributed throughout the whole of 
Upper Burma’ - and by September, officials had already mapped and estimated the path of a 222 
mile railway connecting Mandalay with Rangoon.60 In 1887, and with construction on the 
Mandalay line already proceeding apace, officials also began to explore the possibility of 
extending the railway system through the Mu Valley to the north of Mandalay. Along with 
‘open[ing] out a large tract of fertile country’ filled with ‘rich paddy plains’ and ‘rich forests,’ 
officials were attracted to the region because ‘it would reach the headquarters of the large India-
rubber and jade stone trade and an important distributing centre of salt, all of which are trades 
known to be capable of great development.’ Charles Crosthwaite, the new Chief Commissioner 
of Burma, urged the Government of India of the ‘great importance of opening out the newly 
acquired territory in Upper Burma with good means of communication,’ adding that he was 
“certain that the provision of easy access to all part of it will do more towards its speedy 
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settlement than anything else.’61 With British forces only beginning to establish their presence in 
Upper Burma, railways would not only prove remunerative for the administration, but they 
would also ensure the solidity of British rule in the undeveloped north. Before long, this vision 
would expand to the east of Mandalay and into the Shan States, where a violent struggle between 
British and indigenous forces continued to wage on. 
The movement to expand Burma’s railway system into the Shan States began in October 
1889, when the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Cumming, sent a 
letter to the home government pressing them to consider such an opportunity. Cumming, who 
had been engaged in ‘pacification’ efforts in the region, thought that building a railway to 
Kunlon Ferry – situated on the border with China - would fulfill Colquhoun and Hallett’s vision 
of connecting Burma with China, and ensured ‘that British merchandise would then command 
the market of Southern China.’ Even more importantly, however, were the economic advantages 
a railway bestowed on the Shan States. Because a railway would put an end to the ‘anarchy’ that 
had existed in the region since Thebaw’s reign, Cumming thought, ‘the people and their riches 
will rapidly increase,’ particularly as the region was ‘universally’ known to contain ‘excellent 
land’ and was ‘capable of producing almost any crop.’ Furthermore, a railway also allowed for 
the permanent British occupation of Shan lands, which were politically advantageous to the 
administration. Noting that ‘at present the extremities of the Empire’ were weak, and 
understanding that it is ‘not impossible’ that ‘direct administration of the Shan country may be 
forced upon us,’ Cumming considered a railway to be expedient for political, social, and 
economic purposes.62 With ‘dacoits’ – or bandits - still fighting British forces across the Shan 
States, a railway would calm tensions and persuade locals of the beneficence of British rule.63 
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 The British administration acted quickly on Cumming’s recommendations, and over the 
ensuing months, officials began preparations for the construction of a railway linking Mandalay 
with Kunlon Ferry. In December, only two months after Cumming’s proposal, a survey party 
was sent to the region to estimate the cost and path of the Shan States railway, with support from 
the new Superintendent of the Shan States, A.H. Hildebrand.64 The following cold season, F.R. 
Bagley, the Executive Engineer of the Shan Hills Survey Division, submitted his full report on 
the potential railway to the Chief Commissioner after travelling through the area, and outlined in 
detail his proposal to build the 235-mile railway as soon as possible.65 Similar to what had 
occurred during the 1870s, however, officials with the Government of India balked at such an 
outlay of capital. In September 1890, the Indian government informed Charles Crosthwaite that 
all work on the Shan States railway should be postponed ‘for two or three years’ owing to a lack 
of capital, incensing Burma’s Chief Commissioner. Crosthwaite, in response, hoped that such a 
decision ‘may be re-considered,’ arguing that the matter ‘is one which not only greatly concerns 
the development of trade and the economical and efficient administration of the Shan country, 
but also materially affects the safety of the frontier.’ More than just an issue ‘of mere 
departmental convenience,’ the need for a railway through the Shan States was said to be critical 
to ‘the future prosperity of Burma.’66 Nevertheless, the construction of a railway would wait until 
the late 1890s.  
 Like the railway debates of the 1870s, the lobbying efforts of Anglo-Burmese officials to 
expand Burma’s railway system in the Shan States during the 1890s became centered on the 
region’s economic potential. Critical to these efforts was knowledge accumulation. Beginning in 
the late 1880s, the British administration in Burma appointed two superintendents to the Shan 
States – A.H. Hildebrand in the Southern Shan States and J.G. Scott in the Northern Shan States 
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– who were tasked not only with assuaging relations between local Shan leaders and the British 
state and collecting tributes, but who were also engaged in cataloging information about the 
area’s people and natural resources. This included conducting agricultural experiments in order 
to determine if and how industries like wheat production and sheep and cattle grazing might 
work in a climate more amenable to that which existed in Lower Burma.67 J.G. Scott, in 
particular, became well known throughout the colony, particularly owing to his travels in the Wa 
States along the Chinese border and his regularly published accounts of life in the Shan States.68 
Scott, who also represented the British government in border negotiations with both the Siamese 
and Chinese during this period, would later publish an account of the Shan States, the Gazetteer 
of Upper Burma and the Shan States, at the turn of the century.69 The Gazetteer, published in 
five volumes and with the assistance of J.P. Hardiman, became the de-facto British narrative of 
the region, providing detailed knowledge about the area’s cultural, social, political, and 
geological life that would inform imperial public policy in the Shan States until Burmese 
independence.  
Although efforts to build a railway through the region stalled in 1890, Scott and 
Hildebrand’s reports provided a new base of knowledge about the region that Anglo-Burmese 
lobbyists could lean on with their petitions to the government. Beginning in the mid-1890s, 
efforts to expand the railway system into the Northern Shan States were renewed, but they used a 
new language focusing on the region’s economic viability as opposed to its relationship with the 
markets of China. In December 1893, the Rangoon Gazette published two editorials arguing that 
‘it is not the transfrontier trade that should be our chief objective’ but that ‘our main object in the 
Kunlon railway should be the local trade.’70 This belief was reinforced in official circles. In 
1894, British Burma’s Financial Commissioner noted that the establishment of railway 
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communication and a ‘very large reduction in cost of transit’ would ‘operate to greatly increase 
the volume of the present outward and inward trade’ between Mandalay and the Shan States. The 
construction, however, relied on a variety of important developments in the region, which 
included the creation of a hill station along the line at Maymyo, an expansion in trade by 
‘European enterprise directed towards stock and sheep raising,’ as well as ‘the production of 
minerals.’71 After nearly a decade of discussion on the topic, the realisation of the Shan States 
railway hinged on how the region’s economic future was produced and represented in the 
imperial imagination. 
In 1895, these lobbying efforts came to fruition when the government sanctioned plans 
for the construction of a Northern Shan States railway. With multiple proposals on the table, 
including Colquhoun and Hallett’s line through the Southern Shan States and Bagley’s to Kunlon 
Ferry, the Secretary of State for India sided with the latter, demonstrating the importance that 
government saw in the opening out of the Shan States. Although ‘critics’ would ‘no doubt, find 
fault’ with the decision, the Rangoon Gazette argued, ‘the Shan Hills railway will run its whole 
length through British territory, through a country that every traveller describes as highly fertile,’ 
and that has a ‘healthy climate.’72 With the Colquhoun-Hallett scheme considered ‘at an end,’ 
administrators could focus on establishing the viability of the line, which included the formation 
of Maymyo as a British hill station as well as the construction of a bridge to span the length of 
the Gokteik Gorge in the far north.73 The news would also inspire a surge of interest regarding 





 Debates about the Northern Shan States railway not only reveal how colonial officials 
and businessmen in Burma, India, and Britain remained at odds regarding the expansion of 
public works in the colony, but also how a vision of Burma’s economic potential was paramount 
to shaping official policy on the subject. In order to convince British Indian officials to sanction 
the construction of railways, officials and commercial agents in Burma had to persuade the 
imperial government that such outlays of expenditure would both solve concerns about the 
region’s frontier security as well as provide monetary returns well into the future. The 1890s, 
however, also witnessed a transformation in how such discussions would proceed. It was in the 
1890s that the British government in Burma considered new sources of capital to stimulate 
economic development, looking outside of India’s boundaries to infuse the colony with a new 
spirit of entrepreneurship. This soon resulted in the privatisation of Burma’s railway system. 
At the same time that officials debated the merits of a Northern Shan States railway, the 
topic of privatisation re-entered official policy discussions about Burma’s railway system. In 
1893, with the government still unwilling to sell the Burma State Railways to a private 
enterprise, one local in Burma noted that while there were plenty of reasons for and against the 
privatisation of this colony’s railways, the Indian government’s response had been misleading: 
the lack of railway extension in Burma was not the result of ‘want of pluck and enterprise’ but 
instead to the ‘dog-in-the-manger spirit of the Government of India’ who was ‘in a chronic 
struggle with an unfavourable budget.’74 Despite this, when the Viceroy of India, Lord 
Lansdowne, visited Burma in November 1893, the mainstream press as well as the Rangoon 
Chamber of Commerce acknowledged that Burma had been treated more liberally after the 
annexation. ‘Revenue was taken away in sums out of all proportion to the small province’ during 
the pre-annexation years, the Rangoon Gazette argued, but considering all the ‘accessories of 
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civilised government’ that were expanded in the intervening years – including jails, hospitals, 
school, and most importantly, roads and railways – it could not be said that Burma had been 
treated illiberally.75 Nevertheless, the newspaper was already behind the times. In September, the 
Indian government agreed to negotiate the future of India’s railways, opening up the possibility 
of privatising public works in Burma.76 While the paper remained cautious about such a 
proposal, believing that privatisation would lead to the formation of ‘railway kings’ bent on 
personal aggrandizement like in the United States, their opinion did not represent the views of 
the state or for many in the business community.77 Regardless, within three years, the situation 
would change. 
 In 1896, following a protracted debate, the Rothschilds formed a company to take over 
management of the Burma State Railways. The new company, with capital of £2 million and on 
a contract set for twenty-five years, was named the Burma Railways Company. The Rothschilds, 
whose interests in Indian railways had begun as early as the 1830s, saw railway development in 
Burma as an opportunity to expand development in an area that the colonial state was reluctant to 
invest in, despite the well-known failure of their venture with the Burma Ruby Mines 
Company.78 In Burma, the change was met with a mixed reception among businessmen. As 
rumors of the sale were discussed within Rangoon circles in July 1896, the Chamber of 
Commerce petitioned the government to make the terms of the sale public ‘so that those largely 
interested in carrying arrangements of the country may have an opportunity of seeing that the 
trade will not be unduly effected by what appears to be the granting of a strict monopoly to a 
private syndicate.’79 Rangoon’s businessmen, who had been lobbying the government to take 
over the lines themselves for decades, were likely annoyed that an outsider like the Rothschilds, 
unfamiliar with Burma’s needs and holding too much power for their tastes, would be allowed to 
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take over an enterprise seen as critical to the advancement of their interests and profits.80 In 
response, the government notified the Chamber of Commerce that it was ‘not the first time that a 
State Railway has been handed over to a private company, and the authorities are not likely to 
give any private company such unreserved powers that the public will be at its mercy,’ adding 
that ‘this was only to be expected.’81  
 The privatisation of Burma’s railway system marked a new moment in the colony’s 
history, but such an eventuality emerged from over two decades of debate about how to 
economically develop Burma. Success, however, remained precarious. Although by the turn of 
the twentieth century, railways connected Rangoon with a litany of inland locations across the 
territorial unit of Burma, the railway system never became the pathway of economic success that 
both colonial officials and foreign businessmen expected, and some of Burma’s most important 
commercial industries – including in rice and timber – remained uncommitted to using the 
colony’s railways.82 In 1904, at a “Budget Debate” in the Imperial Legislative Council, the 
former minister of Public Works in India, Sir A.T. Arundel, noted how railway construction in 
Burma remained at a “standstill” under the Rothschilds direction, and that “enormous sums” of 
money had been wasted on lines that should have been “remuneratively expended elsewhere.”83 
Even with privatisation, debates about railway construction in Burma remained as divisive and 
fraught as ever before. By the late 1920s, and with the Burma Railway Company’s lease 
expiring, the lines were handed back over to the colonial government.84  
 Although some industries would develop and thrive in the early twentieth century 
because of Burma’s new railway system, the grandiose visions that colonial officials and foreign 
capitalists held about the potential of railway construction never materialized.85 Even still, 
railways and the debates about railways in Burma reveal how public works and communications 
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projects were a crucial site of dialogue about Burma’s prospects, value, and future during the 
early colonial period, while also showing how myriad agents with often competing aims affected 
the colony’s social and economic development. Nevertheless, while railway development may 
have been an uneven and divisive process in Burma, the conversations and political debates that 
occurred about railways ultimately shaped the creation and material path of the colony’s rail 
lines. In other words, despite the failure of Burma’s railways to deliver on the potential that some 
officials and businessmen saw in it, the construction of Burma’s railways produced a new 
geography of occupation in Burma, connecting Rangoon with vast areas of Burma’s interior by 
rail and solidifying British power in the region. These lines, many of which are still in use today, 
created a new map of British Burma, one that retains its significance in the post-colonial world.86  
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